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The impact of liberalisation on public safety in the transport, water 
and health care sectors 
1.  Introduction 
 
The loss of 304 lives in the sinking of the MV Sewol 14 April 2014, was South Korea’s 
second worst maritime disaster in its history, and the worst in nearly half a century.  
This was made all the more tragic by the fact that most of those killed were secondary 
school students.   
 
The immediate cause of the sinking was a sudden and extreme turn to starboard, 
causing cargo to shift and making the ship unmanageable.  However, investigations into 
why such drastic manoeuvres were undertaken have revealed a litany of safety failures 
on behalf of the company, Chonghaejin Marine, inspectors and regulators.   
 
Mark Dickinson, general secretary of Nautilus, the international union for maritime 
professionals, summarised the failings: “Issues including training, experience, safety 
management, ship design and construction, and the effectiveness of the regulatory 
regime are all critical factors in this disaster…” 1  
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The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (2014) has drawn attention to the role 
played by the deregulation of the transport sector: “Safety experts are now pointing to 
excessive deregulations, privatisation of public transport and emergency services, the 
use of precarious work arrangements and the corrupt appointment of officials in 
oversight agencies as causes of the Sewol tragedy.” 2 
 
This report will examine the complex linkages between liberalisation and public safety 
in transport.  From this preliminary investigation, there does not appear to be a 
universally applicable causal linkage running directly from liberalisation to a 
deterioration in public safety.  However, from a range of case studies, which examine 
the transport, water and health sectors as well as deaths of workers and members of the 
public in contracts operated by Serco, what emerges is that the way in which 
liberalisation is carried out is critical for safety outcomes.  The careful construction of a 
safety culture built up through learning from decades of experience can be swept aside 
by ill-conceived policy reforms.  Increased competitive pressures can lead to a 
prioritisation of performance and the bottom line over more abstract concerns over 
public safety.  Corruption can play a key role.  Institutional realities may mean that a 
newly liberalised transport sector is subject to new or increasingly corrupt practices.   
2.  Context and key issues in transport 
 
International pressure for the liberalisation3 of transport through the General 
Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) stalled during the Doha round of trade talks.  
The US refusal to table an offer on maritime transport led to other OECD countries 
withdrawing their offers to further liberalise shipping services. 4  However, in the 
current negotiations over the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA)5, shipping and both 
air and road transport are on the list of services to be liberalised.  At this time it is 
unclear exactly what offers are on the negotiating table.   
 
Despite the failure to make progress in international negotiations, over the past quarter 
of a century many governments have pushed ahead with transport liberalisation either 
on their own or with the support or encouragement of international agencies.  Much of 
the literature on liberalisation in transport examines the impact on the quality of 
service provision, affordability and working conditions.  This report will focus 
specifically on the linkages between liberalisation and safety, with a focus on maritime 
and rail transport.   
 
From the outset, it should be made clear that there is no ‘smoking gun’ in respect to 
liberalisation and safety.  State ownership, particularly in states with low institutional 
capacity, by no means ensures that sufficient safety standards are upheld, as accidents 
with state-owned ferries, for example, make evident.  On 26 September 2002, a 
Senegalese government-owned ferry, overcrowded, poorly maintained and sailing 
outside of its coastal limit, capsized with the loss of 1863 lives, the second-worst non-
military disaster in maritime history. 6  Similarly, even the best regulations on paper will 
do little to prevent accidents if implementation and enforcement are lacking in practice. 
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In some cases, workers have concluded that safety has improved in the years following 
liberalisation.  A survey of international railworkers conducted by the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) suggests that in most states the railway safety 
situation is improving, though in a number of countries, sub-contracting and 
outsourcing are still creating serious concerns for safety. 7 
Statistics on casualties, incidents or reported safety violations, examining pre- and post- 
liberalisation periods, are hard to come by.  However, even if such systematic 
quantitative analyses were available, the direct implications of liberalisation for safety 
are complicated by dynamic changes in service usage, technology and broader economic 
conditions.  
 
However, what does become clear from an examination of the experience of a number 
of cases of transport liberalisation is that a previously established effective safety 
culture can be broken.  Moreover, liberalisation does not by itself ensure that such a 
culture is (re-)built.  Indeed there are a number of recurrent concerns which suggest 
that, at least in the initial years following regime change, liberalisation can have 
detrimental impacts on safety. 
 
Liberalisation has often meant the removal of state subsidies.  Indeed this has been 
either the explicit or the tacit objective of the process for debt-burdened governments.  
Decisions over whether or not subsidies are appropriate, how they are allocated, and 
who should benefit from their payment, are critical issues of public interest.  Certainly 
their removal subjects transport services to an intensification of competitive pressures.  
These pressures can lead to a de-prioritisation of safety.  This can be exacerbated where 
new ownership/ management does not come from a safety culture or hold an explicit 
commitment to safety in the form of well-designed and well-implemented safety 
systems. 
 
Where government institutions are insufficiently strong to independently regulate and 
discipline private providers, liberalisation can encourage rather than discourage 
corrupt practices.  Privatisation and deregulation require closer collaboration between 
public sector officials and private providers, opening up the opportunity for the spread 
of corrupt practices.  The diffusion of responsibility between newly private providers 
and regulators can cause confusion and delays in needed maintenance and disciplinary 
procedures. 
 
In the maritime transport sector, where for much of contemporary history services have 
been provided by the private sector, the critical regulatory issue has involved a process 
known as ‘flagging out’.  This involves registering vessels under so-called ‘flags of 
convenience’ in countries such as Liberia, Panama and island states such as the Marshall 
Islands.  Interestingly, in many countries, ferry services were held under public 
ownership longest out of higher general awareness of the public interest concerns at 
stake8. 
 
The first step towards this new liberalised arrangement was taken by US and Greek 
shipbuilders ‘flagging out’ in the post-war period in an attempt to avoid domestic 
shipbuilding costs, levels of taxation and seafarers’ wage rates.  9 
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However, competitive pressures soon forced Japanese and European ships to follow 
suit, ‘flagging out’ from the mid 1970s, and allowing the evasion of national collective 
bargaining agreements.  The use of flags of convenience is now ubiquitous across the 
shipping industry.  
 
The issue of the flag of ownership is of crucial importance to safety.  The flag state 
determines requirements in terms of: manning levels, training, hours worked, and 
qualifications; and inspection, ship classification, and standard of safety equipment, 
amongst other factors.  Once host state entry requirements had become a source of 
competitive advantage, this initiated the practice of ship owners ‘shopping around’ for 
the lowest cost crews, classification societies, surveyors/auditors, etc..  As the 
subsequent case studies will reveal, this explains many of the ‘contributory factors’ 
which are ascribed to maritime accidents: insufficient numbers or improperly trained 
staff, seafarer fatigue10, inadequate inspections and investment in maintenance, and 
failing safety systems and equipment. 
 
In the rail sector, what was traditionally felt to be a natural monopoly has been held 
more tightly in public hands in most countries until recently.  Privatisation and 
deregulation of what were national railways has led to the outsourcing of services and a 
fragmentation in systems management.  In some cases this has led to a breakdown in 
both informal collective knowledge and formal information systems for tracking 
maintenance requirements, both of infrastructure and rolling stock.  Whittingham 
(2004, 127) has described this process as the “dilution of knowledge” and the “loss of 
‘controlling mind’”.11 
 
With liberalisation and increased competitive pressures comes an incentive structure 
which focuses on meeting service requirements and shareholders’ expectations for 
profitability over diffuse notions of public safety.  This de-prioritisation of safety is 
reinforced where top management are introduced who do not have railway experience, 
and do not bring with them a safety culture. 
 
Taylor and Sloman (2012, 17) argue that financial pressures coming in the wake of the 
privatisation of the UK rail system were intense: “Key reasons for the increase in costs 
include higher interest payments in order to keep Network Rail’s debts off the 
government balance sheet; debt write-offs; costs arising as a result of fragmentation of 
the rail system into many organisations; profit margins of complex tiers of contractors 
and sub-contractors; and dividend payments to private investors.”12  In such an 
environment, it is hardly surprising that cutbacks lead to a shortage of staff, rising 
turnover, and training failures  13 
as well as reduced investment in both routine maintenance and fixed assets.  These 
changes, as will be seen, can have fatal consequences. 
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3.  Sectoral case studies 
 
3.1 Maritime transport 
 
UK:  The Herald of Free Enterprise 
  
In 1984, as part of its sweeping programme of privatisation of state-owned enterprises 
and deregulation, the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher privatised the 
state ferry company, Sealink.  This was done without putting in place a system to licence 
ferry operators in order to ensure the maintenance of minimum safety standards.  
Instead, operators were left to design their own safety systems. 
 
On 6 March 1987, just minutes after leaving the Belgian port of Zeebrugge, the 
passenger and car ferry, the Herald of Free Enterprise, capsized taking 193 lives.  The 
ferry was owned by UK company P&O (then Townsend Thoresen), but registered in 
Saint Vincent. 
 
The direct cause of the accident was the failure to close the bow doors of the roll-on 
roll-off (Ro-Ro) ferry.   The subsequent inquiry found that overwork played a 
contributory factor in causing the exhausted seafarer whose responsibility it was to 
close the bow doors to oversleep.14  More importantly, there were no safety systems in 
place, either human or automated, to signal his failure to perform his duties to the rest 
of the crew.  The cost of installation of automated warning systems was judged an 
unnecessary cost; though within months of the disaster such systems were in place 
across the company’s fleet.  Commercial pressures were taking priority over safety 
checks, and the crew was under pressure from management to ensure that the ship did 
not sail any later than scheduled.  Safety concerns about overloading and the potential 
for water ingress had been expressed in numerous memorandum from ship Masters, 
but were ignored by management. 15  
 
The official enquiry highlighted serious management failures on the part of the 
operator: 
 “….a full investigation into the circumstances of the disaster leads inexorably to the 
conclusion that the underlying or cardinal faults lay higher up in the Company.  The 
Board of Directors did not appreciate their responsibility for the safe management of 
their ships. … It was the failure to give clear instructions about the duties of the Officers 
on the Zeebrugge run which contributed so greatly to the cause of this disaster...All 
concerned in management, from the members of the Board of Directors down to the 
junior superintendents, were guilty of fault in that all must be regarded as sharing 
responsibility for the failure of management.  From top to bottom the body corporate 
was infected with the disease of sloppiness … It reveals a staggering complacency…the 
‘Marine Department’ [of the company] did not listen to the Complaints or suggestions or 
wishes of their [ships'] Masters." 16  The enquiry expressed hope that consideration 
would be given to a system for licencing the operators of passenger ferries. 
 
An inquest jury found that the cause of death was "unlawful killing". The company was 
charged with 'corporate manslaughter', and some of its executives were also charged 
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with gross negligence and manslaughter, but neither the company nor the executives 
were convicted.    
 
The UK law on corporate manslaughter was changed in 2007 - 20 years later! - 
following other disasters including rail crashes. The new law makes it easier to 
prosecute companies, but so far only 3 have been prosecuted and convicted.17  
 
 
Norway:  Scandinavian Star  
 
Incidents in the early 1990s demonstrate the hazards associated with the deregulation 
of the industry which has led to companies scouring the globe for low-cost crews.  Lane 
(1996, 87) argues that in such a situation of irregularly employed, overworked, 
international crews, it is difficult to establish that seafarers are properly certified or 
trained, let alone create a working social order onboard. 18  
 
In April 1990, the car and passenger ferry, the Scandinavian Star, was en route between 
Norway and Denmark, when she caught fire. Before the ship could be brought back to 
port and the fire extinguished, 159 people had lost their lives.  While investigations over 
suspected arson are ongoing to this day 19 the inquiry found that a contributory factor 
was the inability of the crew to communicate with each other or with the passengers, 
and their lack of preparedness for emergency and evacuation procedures.   
 
The ferry was Norwegian-owned but Bahamian-flagged.  Most of the mixed nationality 
crew had only been taken on one week before the disaster.  The inquiry found that 
Scandinavian officers were unable to communicate with Portuguese and Filipino crew 
members, and that safety notices on board were not in local languages. 20  
 
Egypt:  Al-Salam Boccaccio 98 
 
In February 2006, the Al-Salam Boccaccio 98 Ro-Ro car and passenger ferry sank with 
1034 lives lost.  The ferry was carrying pilgrims returning from the Hajj from Saudi 
Arabia to Egypt.  The subsequent investigation concluded that the cause of the disaster 
was a build-up of water in the hull of the ship after an attempt had been made to put out 
a fire in the engine room. 21 
 
The ferry, owned by Egyptian company Al-Salam Maritime was registered in Panama.  
This allowed the 35 year-old ferry to sail a 160 mile crossing in violation of Egyptian 
laws which prohibit ships over 20 years old from operating more than 20 miles from 
shore. 22 The investigation turned up a long list of failings, including inadequate 
inspection, poor crew training, a lack of safety equipment and improper design 
modifications that had been made to the ship to accommodate more passengers which 
increased instability. 
   
Received wisdom is to blame these failings on corruption in both the Egyptian public 
and private sectors.  The CEO of Al-Salam Maritime was an MP, chair of the sub-
committee on maritime transportation, and a board member of the Red Sea Port 
Authority which had failed in its inspection duties.  Soliman and Cable argue that this 
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corruption can be linked with neoliberal reform.  Widespread deregulation of the 
industry had led to closer collaboration between state and corporate officials, and 
fostered secrecy about this collaboration in order to protect the state’s legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public. 23 
 
Canada: Queen of the North  
 
In March 2006, the MV Queen of the North ran aground and sank with the loss of two 
lives.  The immediate cause was determined to be pilot error and unsafe watchkeeping 
practices. 24  While it may not have prevented her sinking, the ship’s outdated single 
compartment design made her more vulnerable to hull breach.  North Coast Member of 
the British Columbia Legislative Assembly Gary Coons had expressed fears in the month 
prior to the incident that privatisation had led to confusion between the provincial 
government and the private provider, BC Ferries.  Negotiations had been drawn out 
over three new vessels which were to replace the ageing single compartment ships.25 
 
UK:  Swanland and the Ernest Bevin 
  
In November 2011, the general cargo ship Swanland suffered a catastrophic structural 
failure and foundered en route from Wales to the Isle of Wight, with six crew killed.26  
The investigation cited a number of causes of the tragedy: the Swanland had not been 
approved to carry high-density cargoes27 by its flag state or classification society; there 
was a lack of maintenance; surveys conducted on the ship lacked rigour; and the 
Swanland’s crew was inadequately trained in emergency procedures. 
 
The ship was owned by UK-based Swanland Shipping Ltd, and operated by another UK 
firm Torbulk Ltd, but was registered in the Cook Islands.  This was allowed even though 
the ship failed to meet Cook Island registry entry requirements.  The owner had 
transferred the ship’s classification society from Lloyd’s Register to the International 
Naval Surveys Bureau in 2009, reducing the fees paid by about 30%. 28 This is a textbook 
example of a ship owner ‘shopping around’ to find savings on survey and audit fees, 
with the expectation of longer-term savings on the cost of required repairs.  This should 
come as little surprise in an industry under intense financial pressure; the Swanland 
had been operating at a loss, and the firm has since been dissolved.  
 
In its investigation of the Swanland, the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
(MAIB) was at pains to point out that the tragedy was emblematic of a more general 
crisis in the industry.  At the time of the Swanland report, some 248 general cargo ships 
had foundered between 2002 and 2011 with the loss of over 800 seafarers. 
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There was another tragedy on a ferry crossing the river Thames in London in August 
2011, this one illustrating the risks associated with the latest form of government 
outsourcing to large generalised private service contractors that may lack the necessary 
safety experience.  The Woolwich ferry, the Ernest Bevin, had been operated by 
municipal workers for over 120 years, but it was outsourced in 2008 to the private 
company Serco.  A worker was dragged overboard and killed, and an official report 
concluded that, "A number of unseamanlike working practices were evident on board… 
The unmooring operation was a routine task but it had not been captured by the 
company's safety management system… Consequently no risk assessment for the 
operation had been conducted to assess and mitigate the hazards faced by the crew".29 
 
 
3.2 Rail  
 
UK  
 
With the passage of the Railways Act of 1993, the Conservative government of John 
Major split state-owned British Rail into more than 100 businesses and sold them off.  
Twenty-five train operating companies (TOCs) were given contracts to run the services 
themselves.  Ownership of track, signalling and stations and responsibility for their 
maintenance went to Railtrack.  Railtrack outsourced this maintenance work to 
hundreds of private contractors, with responsibility falling upon the lowest-paid 
workers at the bottom who numbered 30% less than when the rail services had been 
under public control.  The Office of the Rail Regulator was established to regulate the 
private provider’s economic performance, while safety regulation remained the 
responsibility of the Health & Safety Executive, a public body. 
 
Despite rapid increases in passenger numbers, track usage fees charged to TOCs were 
fixed, hitting Railtrack’s profits. 30 Combined with the failure of the government to 
impose investment targets on Railtrack, the result was a maintenance backlog.  This was 
further compounded when, due to maintenance problems, TOCs were allowed to pass 
their late service fines on to Railtrack.  Mounting financial pressures led to maintenance 
cutbacks.  Combined with the effects of the fragmentation of maintenance provision and 
the loss of a long history of organisational knowledge and overall oversight, accidents 
were waiting to happen. 
 
In September 1997, at Southall, West London, a Great Western Trains passenger train 
collided with a freight train, killing seven and injuring 139.31  The immediate cause of 
the accident was the driver of the passenger train passing a red signal.  However, a 
number of further factors ensured that the driver’s error would prove fatal.  The inquiry 
found that the train had been operating with a defective Automatic Warning System 
(AWS).  Automatic Train Protection (ATP) equipment had been switched off due to 
problems with the system and a lack of driver training in its operation.  Teams of two 
drivers had been replaced by a single driver the previous year in an effort to cut costs.  
Great Western Trains were fined £1.5 million for violations of health and safety law. 
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Two years later in October 1999, near Paddington in London, 31 people were killed 
and 520 injured (Cullen 2001) when two passenger trains collided head-on.  As in the 
Southall incident, the driver of one of the trains had run a signal.  Once again, a number 
of contributing factors were identified.  Railtrack had failed to convene a signal siting 
committee to review what was a known siting problem where the driver had passed the 
signal.  Problems with driver training were also identified.  Fitting of an ATP system had 
been rejected due to cost.  Thames trains was ultimately fined £2 million, while Network 
Rail (the successor to Railtrack) received a fine of £4 million.  The inquiry report 
explicitly pointed to a number of problems with the way privatisation had been carried 
out:  Fragmentation created management problems; safety leadership had become 
inconsistent; performance targets had weakened the safety culture; franchises were too 
short with inadequate consideration of safety; too many contractors were insufficiently 
supervised by Railtrack. 32 
 
Fragmentation was at the heart of the fatal rail crash at Hatfield in the UK in 2000.  Four 
people were killed and over 70 injured when a GNER train derailed outside of Hatfield 
station in Hertfordshire. 33 The derailment was caused by a fractured rail.  The problem 
with the rail had been identified over a year earlier, but requests to address the problem 
from the regulator were passed between Railtrack and its contractors.34  A replacement 
rail for the one which would eventually cause the derailment was delivered to the site in 
April 2000, but a time could not be agreed to schedule the maintenance.  To avoid the 
high cost of re-scheduling trains during the summer period, the maintenance was finally 
scheduled for November 2000, one month too late. 
 
Maintenance contractor Balfour Beatty was fined £7.5 million while Railtrack was fined 
£3.5 million.  Charges of manslaughter brought against the companies and their 
executives were ultimately dropped.  Nonetheless, the impact of this incident on 
Railtrack was decisive.  Concerns over worn out rails meant that extensive rail 
replacement was carried out across the national network over the following year. This 
led to severe delays, huge losses and hefty fines.  Railtrack’s share value fell 
dramatically, on the basis that it was unprofitable if it is forced to be so safe; and all the 
companies involved denied responsibility.35 Ultimately, this led to the dissolution of 
Railtrack.  It was replaced by a state-owned, not-for-dividend company, Network Rail, in 
2001.  
 
Poor maintenance would be to blame for another deadly derailment in May 2002 at 
Potter’s Bar just north of Greater London.  Seven were killed and 76 injured when a 
West Anglia Great Northern train derailed as a result of points which had been poorly 
maintained due to inappropriate training for maintenance workers.36  Private contractor 
Jarvis Rail ultimately accepted responsibility for the accident.  Jarvis was fined £3 
million, though it would take until 2011 for Network Rail to be fined £3 million.  Once 
again, no individual or corporation was found criminally liable.  However, the long-term 
impact of this and the preceding accidents on Network Rail culminated in a decision to 
take all maintenance work back in-house in 2003. 
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New Zealand   
 
State-owned New Zealand Rail (NZR) was sold in 1993 to a consortium composed of a 
New Zealand merchant bank, a US railways operator, and an individual investor. 37 The 
company was renamed Tranz Rail Ltd.  This marked the culmination of a decade-long 
process of increasing corporatisation and cost-cutting at the state rail company, with 
staffing levels slashed.    
 
In the negotiations over the terms of privatisation, Tranz Rail managed to get its 
employees exempted from the national Health and Safety Act, and was left instead to 
devise and inspect its own safety systems.  In the five years after privatisation, between 
1995 and 2000, eleven Tranz Rail employees were killed.  Armstrong (2013, 25–6) 
argues that several of these deaths were a direct result of staffing cutbacks and Tranz 
Rail’s failure to comply with its own safety systems.  The loss of life only ended with the 
successful call by the railworkers’ union for an independent inquiry in 2000.  After the 
inquiry, the number of derailments, injuries and deaths fell precipitously.  In 2003 the 
exemption of rail employees from the Health and Safety Act was repealed.   
 
 
Canada 
 
In 1999, the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien deregulated rail transport by 
amending the Railway Safety Act to implement Safety Management Systems (SMS).  This 
ended Transport Canada’s role in the oversight of railroads, transferring responsibility 
to the individual companies to regulate themselves.38 
 
A 2007 report by the Canadian Safety Council called for the reinstatement of 
government regulatory oversight, as the move to deregulation "remov[es] the federal 
government's ability to protect Canadians and their environment, and allow[s] the 
industry to hide critical safety information from the public." 39 
Concerns were expressed from a number of corners over both the design of rolling 
stock used to transport hazardous materials, and the rules governing the passage of 
trains carrying such freight through built-up areas.  These fears would prove prescient.   
 
In July 2013, a Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway (MMA) freight train carrying crude 
oil was parked overnight on a main line.  An engine which was left running in order to 
maintain pressure in the air brakes failed, and hand brakes proved insufficient, allowing 
the train to run away unmanned.  The runaway train derailed, setting off a fire and 
explosion that destroyed the town centre of Lac-Mégantic in the province of Quebec.  
The accident was the worst of its kind in Canadian history with 47 lives lost.   
 
The investigation of the Transportation Safety Board (2014) revealed a host of failings 
including: 
 
- An insufficient number of hand brakes had been set.  Train owner MMA had not 
provided sufficient training for its staff on train securement; 
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- Safety systems were not in place to ensure braking in the event of engine failure.  
This reflected a company with a ‘weak safety culture’ and a safety management 
system that was not functioning effectively; and 
- Inadequate safety oversight and discipline by the regulator Transport Canada 
had failed to correct similar problems that had been reported about MMA 
practices over a number of years.40 
 
3.3 Water  
 
UK - Disconnections by privatised water companies in the UK 
 
Following privatisation of water in England and Wales in 1989, there was a sharp rise in 
the number of households disconnected from the water supply for falling behind on 
payments.  In 1994, 18,636 households were disconnected by the privatised water 
companies. 41  
 
The companies were criticised for failing to exercise restraint or social responsibility 
over their disconnections policies, especially because cutting off water supplies 
endangers the health of the household and of the public. In 1992 there was a rise in the 
number of cases of dysentery reported, in all major conurbations in England (other than 
London).  The water companies were further criticised for failing to notify cutoffs to the 
local authority, despite their statutory duty to do so and the attendant health risks of 
not reporting.42 A court case was brought against the companies, supported by the 
medical and nursing professions,  who argued that a clean water supply was essential 
for human life, hygiene and health:   
“Both the NGOs concerned with child poverty and the medical profession opposed the 
disconnection of consumers who did not pay their bill, arguing that there was no reason 
why the companies should have access to a remedy for non-payment of debt that was not 
open to other creditors seeking to recover debts.” 43 
 
When their powers to disconnect were curtailed, the companies started using ‘pre-
payment meters’ for customers unable to pay their bills. These supplied water when 
charged with a card: otherwise the household would get no water. By 1996 over 16,000 
had been installed, which led to “a startling increase in the number of hidden 
disconnections associated with these meters”.  A municipality successfully challenged 
the legality of these prepayment meters.44  Finally, a new government passed a new 
Water Act in 1998, which made it illegal for water companies to disconnect customers’ 
water supply, or to install pre-payment meters, or ‘trickle valves’.    
 
Brazil – disconnections and contaminated water 
In Parana, Brazil, families were disconnected by Veolia’s subsidiary, Sanepar, for failure 
to pay water bills.  By November 2002, months after being disconnected, poor families 
in Maringá were reported as using rain water for cooking and drinking purposes. 45  In 
January 2003, consumers in Vila Democracia, in the metropolitan region of Paraná’s 
capital city, Curitiba, were also using contaminated water because they could not afford 
to pay for the bills issued by Sanepar 46.  
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South Africa: deaths from cholera as a result of commercial charges for water 
In August 2000, a cholera outbreak started outside Empangeni in Kwazulu-Natal, with 
later outbreaks elsewhere. By February 2002 the total death toll from cholera had risen 
to 260, the worst epidemic in the history of South Africa.47 The development of the 
epidemic was linked by many, including South African Water and Forestry Minister 
Ronnie Kasrils, to the operation of government policies of full cost recovery for water. 
Kasrils said the health problems arose when the poor were excluded from water 
supplies because they could not afford full cost price of water.  This policy was 
advocated by the World Bank, which argued that full cost recovery, without government 
subsidies, was necessary to attract private companies 48 
 
Gabon, water privatisation and typhoid 
Gabon, a former French colony, sold 51 per cent of the state water and electricity 
company SEEG, to French multinational Veolia, in 1997, in a privatisation designed by 
the World Bank’s private sector division, the International Finance Corporation (IFC). In 
December 2004, Gabon suffered its first ever outbreak of typhoid, with 50 cases in 
Oyem, a town of 35,000 people, following repeated breakdowns of the local water 
supply system. Julien Meye, a doctor at the endemic diseases service in Libreville, stated 
that the epidemic had broken out after several months of disruption to the supply of 
drinking water in Oyem. The people of Oyem complained of systematic water and 
electricity cuts in October 2004, and some of the villages in the surrounding area had 
not had water for several months. The deputy mayor, Emmanuel Obame Ondo, blamed 
the privatisation of water supply services for the breakdown in distribution, saying the 
country’s water and electricity utility, SEEG, had failed to extend water pipes to newly 
built areas.49  
 
3.4 Health  
 
UK Hospital cleaning 
 
Cleaning was one of the first services to be contracted out in the NHS in the 1980s.  
During the decade of the 1990s, there was an increased incidence of hospital acquired 
infections, such as meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and C difficile.  
These had an impact on the quality of patient care and the costs of treatment in the 
acute sector.  An international study, published in 2002, established links between 
cleaning and hospital acquired infections. 50 In the last decade there has been an 
increased awareness among government auditors about the problems of improving 
cleaning practices in the NHS when specifications of cleaning contracts are difficult to 
change. 
 
In a report by the Auditor General of Wales (2003), a link was made between 
contracting out of services and hospital infections.  The findings of this study show how 
the contracting process needed more attention if standards of cleanliness were to 
improve. 51 Cleaning services were usually considered the responsibility of the cleaning 
staff and not that of staff, patients and visitors.  The report found that cleaning 
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specifications had not kept up with changes in the hospital environment.  The higher 
turnover of patients, new types of care and increased use of facilities all demand 
increased cleaning procedures. 25% of the 2,000 cleaning workers in Wales had only 
been in post for 6 months.   Seven out of 17 acute hospitals in Wales had not re-written 
their cleaning contracts for 10 years, since the introduction of Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering.   Three out of the four hospitals with an external contractor had kept the 
same contractor.  
 
The failure to review cleaning specifications led to a failure to draw up a realistic 
cleaning budget.  This affected the purchase of new cleaning equipment.   Cleaning 
contracts often did not take into account the expansion of ward areas, which increase 
the volume of cleaning required.  Increasingly, cleaning staff were involved in serving 
food and working as health care assistants, which limited the time available for 
cleaning.  Staff absences and high staff turnover also contributed to difficulties in 
working to existing cleaning contract specifications. 
 
Two case studies of hospital cleanliness in two acute hospitals in Scotland, which 
covered an in-house contractor and a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) (public-private 
partnership) contractor, found that in the case of the PFI hospital there was a “clear rift 
between the ICT members and the domestic team in the PFI case”.52  The infection 
control team in the PFI hospitals felt that the PFI contractor did not seek their advice or 
recognise their role.  All domestic supervisors and nursing teams felt that working as a 
team was important but domestic staff had a different perception.  In both cases, 
domestic staff felt that they were separated from the health care team.  However, in the 
‘in-house’ hospital, the infection control teams felt that the domestic team generally 
took advice from the infection control team and nurses in the in-house case.  Meetings, 
in the form of in-house working groups and domestic services liaison groups, were an 
important way for the teams to share information.  The situation in the PFI hospital was 
different.  Domestic teams and clinical teams did not meet regularly.  The PFI domestic 
manager reported that contact was made only when necessary. 
  
In two reports in 2005 and 2007, Davies drew together research on hospital acquired 
infections with contracting out of services. 53 He argued that high quality cleaning has an 
important role to play in reducing hospital infections.    The contracting process 
contributes to problems in drawing up contracts that are flexible enough to meet 
changed circumstances.  External contractors are often unwilling to share poor financial 
and management information because it is considered commercially sensitive.  This also 
results in problems of imposing sanctions.  The separation of the cleaning team from 
other infection control teams in hospitals makes the process of improving cleanliness in 
a hospital more difficult and less coordinated. Cleaning is a labour intensive process so 
that any attempt to cut costs will be made at the expense of workers. 
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3.5 Serco  
Table   Deaths of workers and members of the public in contracts operated by Serco, 2006-
2014 
Country Sector Date  Sanctions and enquiries Reports 
UK Road 2006 M5 motorway, 
Bristol. Maintenance 
worker killed by fall  
£300,000 fine: “Serco did 
not plan, manage and 
monitor the work 
properly” 
Companies fined £300,000 for 
worker's death on motorway  
UK Rail 2007 Docklands light 
railway, London. 
Passenger on line 
killed by train 
£450,000 fine: “found 
guilty of breaching its 
heath and safety duties”  
DLR operator fined £450,000 
for failing to stop a train after 
a passenger fell onto the track 
UK Ferry 2011 Woolwich free ferry, 
London. Worker 
killed while mooring 
  “The unmooring 
operation was a routine 
task but it had not been 
captured by the 
company's safety 
management system” 
Woolwich Ferry: Poor 
working practices blamed for 
teen's horrific death Critical 
report after ferry death 
UK Health 
care 
2011 Cornwall: boy dies 
during ‘after hours’ 
medical services 
contract 
“short of staff, provided 
inadequate training, left 
patients facing long waits 
and manipulated its 
results” 
NHS watchdog severely 
reprimands Serco out of hours 
GP services in Cornwall 
UK Social 
care 
2013 Woman dies after 
fall at care home. 
Inquest, civil case 
(current 2014) 
Jan 2014 Inquest likely after 
death of Ipswich woman 
following fall at Serco-run 
care home   
UK Detent
-ion 
centres 
2004
-
2014 
7 Deaths of inmates 
in Colnbrook, 
Dungavel, Yarls 
Wood    
e.g.    Man transferred to 
hospital without medical 
notes 
Serco on the stand: Death of a 
US tourist in UK immigration 
detention ; "we have 
frequently had to highlight the 
lack of clear and effective 
systems to ensure that the 
nature of an emergency is 
correctly communicated, and 
that healthcare and detention 
staff working in IRCs are 
sufficiently trained and 
equipped to deal with medical 
emergencies."    
Aust-
ralia 
Detent
-ion 
centres 
2010 Three asylum 
seekers commit 
suicide in detention 
centre 
Companies and state 
agency failed to care for 
the detainees; staff were 
“careless, ignorant or 
both”, communications 
between agencies were 
“sadly lacking”. 
Detention centre staff 
condemned by coroner 
over deaths of Villawood 
detainees) 
 
The table shows a series of deaths of workers and members of the public which have 
occurred in various sectors where the service operators have been criticised and/or 
fined by regulators, inquests, and official safety agencies, or have agreed to compensate 
families of the deceased, for failings in relation to the deaths.  All the companies in the 
table are subsidiaries of Serco, a UK company which operates worldwide.   
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These deaths show the wide range of ways in which public safety can be affected by 
contractors’ failings.  There are some recurring themes in the inquests and official 
reports into these deaths. 
 
Inadequate procedures 
Serco was criticised for not planning and managing its motorway maintenance work 
properly; for not including the basic routine of unmooring a ferry in its safety 
management system; for not having an adequate procedure for stopping trains in an 
emergency; for not having systems to record falls by patients in care homes; and for lack 
of effective systems for communicating medical emergencies in detention centres.  This 
failing applies across sectors, and over time, despite statements after each case that 
Serco would put in place procedures to ensure that such deaths would not happen 
again.  
 
Lack of training 
Serco was criticised for inadequate training of staff on its after-hours medical care 
contract; for inadequate training of its security and healthcare staff within detention 
centres; for failing to make its construction workers aware of risks. In addition to the 
deaths listed in the table above, Serco and other contractors have paid compensation in 
14 cases where children in detention centres were forcibly restrained. 54 
 
Lack of communication and deliberate misrepresentation - between the private 
company and government agencies and other contractors 
This was identified as a specific problem in relation to detention centre deaths in the UK 
and Australia, and the death of the passenger on the DLR, and the out-of-hours medical 
services contract, where Serco was criticised by the NAO for ‘manipulating its results’ by 
lying: “Serco staff fiddled the figures on an astonishing 252 occasions between January 
and June 2012.”55   Serco has also been fined for deliberately misrepresenting its 
performance on a contract for electronic tagging of prisoners. 56 
 
Lack of accountability 
In the absence of direct public management, regulators and public agencies in all sectors 
had no control over or knowledge of Serco’s operating performance until after the 
events.  
 
All of these problems can be explained as systematic risks of outsourcing public service 
work in these areas. Contractors have a permanent incentive to reduce costs as a way of 
increasing profit margins, and cutting indirect overheads such as training and safety 
procedures are obvious candidates for such cost-cutting. They also have incentives to 
misrepresent their performance to avoid penalties or bad publicity.  
 
These cases do not show that Serco is a-typically bad compared with other contractors.  
Culpable deaths have occurred under other contractors, for example, deaths of 
prisoners and detainees in contracts run by G4S.  Rather, it illustrates the general risks 
of using contractors, because Serco operates across a far wider range of  sectors and 
services than any other contractor. In addition to the services covered in the table – 
railways, ferries, security guards, roads maintenance, health care, social care, and 
prisons -   it also has concessions and contracts to run airports, general administrative 
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tasks, laboratories, military data gathering, waste management, and other activities.  
Moreover,  over95% of  of Serco's business comes from public service contracts. It does 
almost nothing except public sector work, and so it is wholly dependent on government 
and local government policy decisions, which favour the use of privatisation and 
outsourcing. It does not bring expertise or finance from other operations supplying 
consumers and companies through normal markets.  Its only expertise is in gaining and 
operating public service business. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
The tragic sinking of the MV Sewol is another in a long list of preventable tragedies in 
maritime transport.  This report has suggested that the role played by liberalisation in 
creating the conditions primed for such an accident to occur is not unique.  Across a 
range of countries, the process of liberalisation has been deficient in its attention to the 
implications of the process for safety outcomes.   
 
In the maritime transport sector, the deregulatory impact of the ‘flagging out’ of 
ownership has been critical.  Competitive pressures lead ship owners to ‘shop around’ 
for a flag state which is most lenient in terms of its entry requirements, or which is 
willing to ‘look the other way’ when vessels do not meet those requirements.  The same 
process repeats itself in the hiring of crew, and the selection of classification societies, 
inspectors and auditors.  Those same economic pressures, where safety is not deeply 
embedded in corporate institutions and culture, incentivise reductions to investment, 
cuts in maintenance and training, and increased pressure on seafarers’ working hours. 
 
In the rail sector, privatisation has led to outsourcing, and the fragmentation of what 
was previously a unified body of knowledge of a complex network.  Accountability may 
become diffused between regulator, private service provider and outsourced 
contractor.  Once again, where new ownership lacks a corporate commitment to safety, 
a deregulatory shift to corporate responsibility for safety systems opens the way for the 
prioritisation of cost savings and the meeting of service requirements.  The combination 
of these factors may lead to cutbacks in investment in new infrastructure, reductions in 
regular maintenance, and the employment of fewer railway workers toiling under 
intense pressure and lacking adequate training. 
 
In the water sector, the effects of water privatisation in some countries have resulted in 
increased outbreaks of water borne diseases.  Private companies have introduced 
policies of full-cost recovery for water services, which has increased the price of water.  
Increased prices lead to non-payment by low income households.  Water companies 
have implemented disconnections if households fail to make payments for water 
services in a much more systematic way than government-run water services.  This 
results in increased risks to health.  
 
In the health care sector, the impact of the contracting out of cleaning services in the 
NHS results from the way in which the process of contracting out fragments cleaning 
activities from the rest of the hospital.  When a service is contracted out, each activity, 
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which is included as part of the service, is itemised as a separate task.  This works 
against the development of team work in the hospital.  The move away from a holistic to 
a fragmented approach creates a lack of continuity between cleaners, clinical staff, 
managers, patients and visitors and there is no shared sense of responsibility for 
cleanliness across the hospital.  The relationship between cleaning staff and clinical staff 
is crucial for maintaining high standards of cleanliness in a hospital.   
 
This report provides some initial insight into the complex linkages between 
liberalisation and safety in the transport, water and health sectors.  Further research is 
needed to extend the coverage and depth of that analysis. 
 
In the maritime sector, with access to Lloyd’s maritime data it might be possible to 
examine the relationship between deregulation and a number of variables such as 
casualties, changes in ship classification, and detentions related to safety deficiencies. 
Discussions at the national level with maritime workers’ unions and maritime safety 
agencies could help to unpack the particular concerns about safety which have not been 
brought to light through accidents or casualties.  Many gaps in our knowledge remain 
over the impact on safety of different models of financing, corporate governance and 
regulatory structure.  Similarly, in the rail sector, further research is needed to 
synthesize lessons from national level examinations by regulators and trade unions of 
conditions before and after liberalisation.  Preventing further tragedies like the sinking 
of the MV Sewol requires that transport workers’ unions are ever-vigilant and are able 
to learn the lessons of the past. 
 
Recommendations for Health and Safety Policy in Korea 
 
 Lobby for the creation of a Corporate Manslaughter Bill – to make companies liable 
for the public safety of services provided 
 Systems of public procurement to specific accountabilities and responsibilities for 
public safety 
 Specifications, supported by law, of defined minimum staffing levels and continuous 
training on public transport and other public services 
 Trade unions to monitor existing public safety arrangements in public services and 
identify deficiencies 
 Trade unions to lobby for greater monitoring of quality of services and high 
standards of public safety 
 Lobby for the setting up of a Korea Public Safety Agency and accompanying 
legislation to strengthen responsibilities and accountabilities for public safety at 
political, legal and social levels (workers/ services users)  
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